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The Matching Problem within
Comparative Welfare State Research:
How to Bridge Abstract Theory
and Speciﬁc Hypotheses
SABINA STILLER* and KEES VAN KERSBERGEN**
*Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands; **Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The Netherlands
ABSTRACT This paper draws attention to the problem of matching abstract theory and speciﬁc
hypotheses within welfare state research, which reinforces the dependent variable problem and
entails methodological diﬃculties. We show that matching theory and hypotheses is a ubiquitous
problem in the literature. We further elaborate and illustrate the argument with an empirical
example from our research on structural welfare state reform. We observe two methodological
problems: 1) the risk of drawing conclusions about one level of analysis using evidence from
another; 2) the problem of translating causal mechanisms formulated at a high level of
abstraction to a lower level.
Introduction
Scholarly work on the welfare state is characterized by many theoretical and
empirical schools. Recently, research attention has been redirected to explaining
variation in welfare state reform. The conceptualization of the dependent variable
‘‘reform’’, however, has caused considerable theoretical, empirical and methodolo-
gical confusion and, accordingly, scholarly debate, both within mainstream
approaches and between the mainstream literature and other approaches (such as
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the regulation school with its focus on the changes in production regimes and issues
of ‘‘workfare’’).
The debate on the dependent variable problem (see Green-Pedersen 2004, Ku¨hner
2007), that is, the conceptual and operational ambiguity about how the explanatory
problem of welfare state reform is formulated for research purposes, has
considerably improved our understanding of reform. We now have sharper
speciﬁcations of welfare state reform and its various dimensions (see Pierson 2001a
and below), more valid operationalizations and more reliable measurements of
crucial concepts (such as decommodiﬁcation, see Allan and Scruggs 2004), better
datasets (see the dataset collected by Allan and Scruggs: http://sp.uconn.edu/
*scruggs/wp.htm), important debunking eﬀorts of overly speculative theories (for
example Swank 2002, Castles 2004) and promising methodological innovations (for
example Jaeger and Kvist 2003, Vis 2007).
Part of the solution to the dependent variable problem surely lies in further
improving the quality of the data, operationalizations, measurements and
methods as well as disaggregating research attention to the programme level
(Ku¨hner 2007). But even if we would have perfect measures and operationaliza-
tions, we are still left with the problem that so many diﬀerent and competing
(explanatory) theories seem to ﬁt the same data on welfare state reform. In order
to explain welfare state reforms, a great variety of explanatory approaches has
been formulated. This variety reinforces the dependent variable problem as
diﬀerent theories suggest diﬀerent conceptualizations and operationalizations of
the welfare state or reform as the dependent variable. In any case, these rival
theories cannot all be correct at the same time. But how to test such competing
theories empirically? We think that in research practice there has been insuﬃcient
awareness of the necessity, but also of the complexity and diﬃculty, of
competitive hypothesis testing. It involves a comparison of types of explanation,
for instance whether political or economic factors are driving welfare state
reform. Next, one needs to establish the explanatory status of the theories
involved. Does the theoretical model specify causes and eﬀects in a correlational
approach or does the theory mainly describe causal mechanisms linking cause and
eﬀect in a historical approach? Also, the level of analysis at which theories specify
their hypotheses diﬀer. For competitive testing, it matters whether one aims to
explain changes of or in welfare state regimes or social policy programmes.
Finally, there is the issue of the operational and empirical speciﬁcity of the
hypotheses that can vary between theories and that may complicate comparison
between theories with respect to their empirical validity.
In this paper we cannot hope to even start solving all these issues, but propose to
focus on the operational and empirical speciﬁcity of hypotheses. The reason for this
choice is that frequently the potential problems involved here are either not
recognized or not well addressed. We believe that a better appreciation of the
problem is critically important as diﬀerent operationalizations tend to lead to
diﬀerent conclusions about the hypotheses that are deduced from the theory being
tested. We deﬁne the issue as a problem of matching, which refers to the diﬃculty of
matching propositions formulated at a high(er) level of abstraction with hypotheses
than can be tested empirically. We call attention to this phenomenon, particularly as
the matching problem tends to reinforce the dependent variable problem, a problem
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that is far better known and dealt with in the literature (Green Pedersen 2004, Clasen
and Siegel 2007, Ku¨hner 2007).
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section we present a short
overview of recent welfare state research to provide the background for an
identiﬁcation of the problem of the dependent variable and the re-speciﬁcation of
welfare state reform in terms of diﬀerent dimensions. In the third section we
elaborate the matching problem, arguing that cause and eﬀect tend to be speciﬁed on
diﬀerent levels of analysis, as a result of which the conceptualization and
operationalization of the causal mechanism(s) and the dependent variable becomes
complicated and the dependent variable problem is reinforced. By discussing
examples using diﬀerent analytical techniques, we show that matching is a problem
of the ﬁeld as a whole. Some circumvent the problem by remaining at a high level of
abstraction and oﬀer only loosely connected empirical illustrations. Others evade the
problem by discarding theory and focusing on technically advanced quantitative
tests of loosely connected (if at all) models that include variables from widely
diverging theories. Most empirical researchers ﬁnd practical solutions, for instance
by combining a variable-oriented and a case-oriented approach, but still fail to make
explicit how they have tried to match theoretical statements at one level with
empirical statements at another level.
Our point is that we would like to raise awareness of the problem and spell out the
intricacies involved. Instead of oﬀering further detailed criticisms of other people’s
work, we present as a ﬁnal example the work of one of us (Stiller 2007) to track in
some detail how one travels from (abstract) theory, the level at which the causes of
reform are formulated, to empirically testable hypotheses on causal mechanisms. In
other words, to clarify better the matching problem and illustrate how to deal with it
explicitly, we discuss one example of research practice in some more detail rather
than present a sketchy discussion of a multitude of studies. Finally, the last section
draws together the lessons of the foregoing discussion and ends with some
recommendations on how to proceed from here.
Welfare State Reform: the Dependent Variable Problem
Until roughly 1990, the welfare state (its emergence and expansion) was routinely
conceptualized in terms of welfare eﬀort and operationalized as social spending. The
literature of the early 1990s began to rethink what precisely welfare state theory
should explain. The social spending variable was rightfully criticized for its loose
correspondence to the theoretical issues of social democratization (Esping-Andersen
1990). Esping-Andersen argued that there was a striking conceptual indiﬀerence in
the literature with respect to the dependent variable: the welfare state. Starting from
the judgement that ‘‘expenditures are epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of
welfare states’’ (1990: 19), and the reﬂection that ‘‘it is diﬃcult to imagine that
anyone struggled for spending per se’’ (1990: 21), he suggested that the study of
welfare states should focus on the quality of social rights, the typical patterns of
stratiﬁcation, and the manner in which the state, the market and the family
interacted in the production of social welfare.
By looking beyond spending patterns, Esping-Andersen was able to distinguish
three types of welfare state regimes: a social democratic, a liberal and a corporatist or
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conservative regime. These regimes diﬀered with respect to the major institutions
guaranteeing social security (the state, the market or the family); the kind of
stratiﬁcation systems upheld by the institutional mix of these institutions (the extent
of status and class diﬀerentiation, segmentation and inequality typically implied in
social security systems); and the degree of de-commodiﬁcation, that is to say ‘‘the
degree to which individuals, or families, can uphold a socially acceptable standard of
living independently of market participation’’ (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 37). This
inspired a whole new generation of research that focused on the explanation of
variation between regimes, provoking discussion on the dependent variable ‘‘welfare
state regime’’ and the correct typology to use as a suitable standard in comparative
analysis.
Overlapping with this new way of looking at the welfare state, there was a gradual
shift in the research attention away from ‘‘expansion’’ and ‘‘variation’’ of welfare
state regimes towards ‘‘reform’’ and ‘‘retrenchment’’ (or their absence) of the welfare
state as the main explanatory problem. A groundbreaking historical institutionalist
study of welfare state change was Paul Pierson’s (1994) Dismantling the Welfare
State? His main ﬁnding was that, in spite of mounting pressures from liberal forces
symbolized by the names of Reagan and Thatcher and in contrast to changes in the
arenas of macroeconomic policy, industrial relations or regulatory policy, ‘‘the
welfare state stands out as an island of relative stability’’ (1994: 5). Welfare states
resisted change. In explaining this unexpected phenomenon, Pierson focused on
institutional structures and electoral mechanisms. In his view, the former included
networks of welfare bureaucracies and services in the policy areas of social housing,
health care, education, public assistance and social security, the very existence of
which was bound to the status quo in social policy and which therefore mounted
powerful resistance against attempts of retrenchment. These professional networks
were created by postwar welfare state development, and once established they were
able to muster substantial veto power against reform eﬀorts (Pierson, 1996: 147).
Because these structures stood for path continuity, a weakening of the historical
supporters of welfare state expansion (for example social democracy) did not
necessarily translate into commensurate weakening of social policy.
Moreover, Pierson argued, ‘‘frontal assaults on the welfare state carry tremendous
electoral risks’’ (1996: 178). While welfare expansion usually generated a popular
politics of credit claiming for extending social rights and raising beneﬁts to an
increasing number of citizens, austerity policies aﬀronted large groups of voters.
Even ‘‘retrenchment advocates . . . confront a clash between their policy preferences
and their electoral ambitions’’ (Pierson, 1996: 146) and, as a rule, the latter prevailed.
In the literature on reform, there arose considerable confusion around the
question ‘‘what is to be explained’’ and the speciﬁcation of the dependent variable.
Pierson (2001b) observed that there was a lack of consensus on welfare state
outcomes, particularly with respect to the issue of how much welfare states had
actually changed since the end of the Golden Age of growth, that is to say, roughly
since the 1980s. The controversy over the dependent variable was ﬁrst of all a result
of the indistinctness of the concept of the welfare state itself. Too many and quite
divergent phenomena were being discussed under the same heading. Welfare state
research seemed to suﬀer from a weakness well known in comparative politics and
comparative policy analysis: concept stretching. Related to this was the problem of
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which indicators to use for the operationalization of ‘‘the welfare state’’ or reform.
Finally, Pierson also noticed theoretical weaknesses that concerned the implicit
assumption in many studies that one could measure welfare state change on a single
scale. He observed that there was a tendency to reduce the problem of welfare state
retrenchment and reform to a dichotomy of ‘‘less’’ versus ‘‘more’’ and ‘‘intact’’
versus ‘‘dismantled’’, which was an unwarranted theoretical simpliﬁcation.
Pierson proposed to solve the dependent variable problem and improve our
understanding of welfare state change by looking at three dimensions:
(1) Recommodiﬁcation: the attempt ‘‘to restrict the alternatives to participation in
the labour market, either by tightening eligibility or cutting beneﬁts’’ (Pierson
2001b: 422), that is to say, to strengthen the whip of the labour market;
(2) Cost containment: the attempt to keep balanced budgets through austerity
policies, including deﬁcit reduction and tax moderation;
(3) Recalibration: ‘‘reforms which seek to make contemporary welfare states more
consistent with contemporary goals and demands for social provision’’ (Pierson
2001b: 425).
Making use of the strengths of Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) regime approach and
the country and policy area studies he brought together in his edited volume, Pierson
(2001b) inferred that each regime (social democratic, liberal or conservative) was
characterized by its own speciﬁc ‘‘new politics’’ of welfare state reform. For instance,
in the liberal regime voters are less likely to be attached to the welfare state than in
the conservative or social democratic models. In this regime recommodiﬁcation is the
pivotal dimension of welfare state reform. In the social democratic welfare regime,
voters are highly attached to, and dependent on, the welfare state. Recommodiﬁca-
tion is not so much on the political agenda of reform, but – if only because of the
sheer size of the public sector – cost containment is. The conservative regime is
probably the most ill-adapted model of the three worlds of welfare capitalism, as a
result of which recalibration and cost containment are the two dominating
dimensions of reform. Here, the issue is how to stimulate job growth in the
underdeveloped service sector and how to contain the exploding costs of pensions,
disability beneﬁts, and health care.
Contemporary research seems to have taken seriously Pierson’s suggestion of the
multi-dimensionality of the dependent variable (see Wincott 2003). For example, the
issue of cost containment and retrenchment (or regress, as Korpi 2003 calls it) is taken
up, for instance, in the broad study by Huber and Stephens (2001) and by Green-
Pedersen (2004). Olli Kangas’ (2004) study of sickness beneﬁts in 18 OECD countries
indicates that – in spite of continuing institutional distinctiveness – cost containment
and retrenchment in Scandinavia causes convergence towards the continental welfare
states. Korpi and Palme (2003) have shown that retrenchment has become a
signiﬁcant phenomenon in many countries.
With respect to recommodiﬁcation, one can ﬁnd at least ﬁve diﬀerent notions in the
literature. First, as already noted, Pierson (2001b) deﬁnes recommodiﬁcation as the
eﬀort to restrict the alternatives to participation in the labour market, either by
tightening eligibility or cutting beneﬁts. Second, there are scholars who link
recommodiﬁcation to changes in the international economy (Geddes 1994). Third,
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Breen (1997) looks at recommodiﬁcation from a risk and stratiﬁcation perspective
and argues that recommodiﬁcation occurs whenever hedging institutions, mechan-
isms or arrangements are weakened. Fourth, Bonoli (1998) sees recommodiﬁcation
as the opposite of decommodiﬁcation and analyzes measures that are intended to
weaken the position of commodiﬁed workers. Finally, Holden (2003) holds that
recommodiﬁcation occurs when states withdraw from the ﬁeld of social welfare.
Recalibration seems to be a much less studied topic, but there are scattered (mainly
German) examples, such as Lamping and Ru¨b’s (2004) study of the restructuring of
the German pension system and Leibfried and Obinger’s (2003) analysis of the
direction of social policy reforms in Germany.
Finally, a dimension of welfare state reform that Pierson did not distinguish
(probably because he saw it as an aspect of recommodiﬁcation) concerns activation
and (market-driven) workfare. There is a host of literature also on this dimen-
sion, particularly prominent in the regulation approach (for an overview see Vis
2007), but the issue also seems particularly ‘‘hot’’ among British social scientists who
study welfare policies under New Labour in a comparative perspective (for example
Clasen and Clegg 2003, Lindsay andMailand 2004, Taylor-Gooby et al. 2004, Wright
et al. 2004). Moreover, it has inspired studies of activation in cases such as Germany
and Austria (Ludwig-Mayerhofer and Wroblewski 2004), the Netherlands (Van
Oorschot 2004), and the Netherlands and Denmark (Van Oorschot and Abrahamson
2003).
Although Pierson considerably improved our understanding of welfare state
reform, his analyses still suﬀered somewhat from a weakness that is inherent to
the institutional approach. Institutionalist analyses are very well capable of
explaining institutional resilience, but have much more diﬃculties with under-
standing institutional and policy change (see Taylor-Gooby 2002). There seems to be
a growing awareness of this explanatory problem of institutionalist approaches.
The Matching Problem in Comparative Welfare State Research
Depending on the type of theory proposed, scholarly work highlights diﬀerent
aspects of welfare state reform, that is, of the dependent variable. Equally important
is to note that there are various explanatory approaches that compete with each
other, but nevertheless seem to ﬁt the same empirical data. In other words, it seems
exceedingly diﬃcult to properly assess their theoretical and empirical value. We have
already introduced four aspects of this issue that we now will brieﬂy elaborate: the
type of explanation; the explanatory status of the theory (in terms of the speciﬁcity of
the underlying causal model); the level of analysis; and the operational and empirical
speciﬁcity of the hypotheses.
Looking at types of explanation for welfare state reform, we ﬁnd a) economic
explanations, including studies of internationalization and globalization (for
example Glatzer and Rueschemeyer 2005, Kemmerling 2005, Kittel and Winner
2005), b) institutional explanations (for example Pierson 2001a, Obinger et al. 2005),
party-political explanations (Kitschelt 2001, Green-Pedersen 2002, Burgoon and
Baxandall 2005), d) discourse and framing-related explanations (Be´land 2005,
Schmidt 2000, Schmidt et al. 2005), and e) hypotheses on how European level
policies aﬀect national welfare states (Ferrera and Gualmini 2004, Natali 2005).
138 S. Stiller and K. van Kersbergen
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Next, the explanatory status refers to the precise type of causal argument
employed in a study. Macro-level quantitative analyses usually employ a correlation
approach focusing on the relation between variables that represent cause(s) and
eﬀect(s) (for example Castles 2004). Meso-level studies usually study causal
mechanisms in addition to specifying causes and eﬀects (for example, the many
case studies we ﬁnd in the ﬁeld; see for an overview Starke 2006). Rare but important
are the studies that combine both, as Huber and Stephens (2001) do.
If we focus on the level of analysis we note that welfare state reform is usually
either analyzed at the macro-level of the determinants of regime change via
comparative case studies or cross-national (pooled) quantitative studies, or at the
meso-level of the determinants of changes in single programmes, such as
unemployment insurance, sickness beneﬁts, pension beneﬁts and so on (for exam-
ple on pensions: Bonoli 2001, Immergut et al. 2007; or on unemployment: Clasen
2005).
The ﬁnal category is the operational and empirical speciﬁcity of the hypotheses. This
is the aspect we focus on further because it is all too often neglected or not properly
addressed in the literature. Diﬀerent operationalizations may lead to diﬀerent
conclusions about the hypotheses that are deduced from the theory that is being
tested. Remember Esping-Andersen’s (1990: 19) insight on the operationalization of
the dependent variable: ‘‘Most . . . studies claim to explain the welfare state. Yet their
focus on spending may be misleading. Expenditures are epiphenomenal to the
theoretical substance of welfare states.’’ His operationalization remained closer to
the theoretical substance in terms of the various qualitative dimensions of the welfare
state. This not only opened up a whole new way of looking at welfare state
development, but also in one stroke made redundant a whole series of theories that
had focused on social spending alone.
The issue on which we focus is the matching problem: frequently, causes and
eﬀects are speciﬁed at diﬀerent levels of analysis, which has consequences for the
conceptualization and operationalization of the causal mechanisms and the
dependent variable. The crucial point is that this matching problem reinforces
the dependent variable problem. We believe that the matching problem is a general
phenomenon in various welfare state research traditions. If we make a distinction
between, on the one hand, the mainstream literature that uses welfare state regime
theory as an analytical instrument, and, on the other hand, the regulation approach
to political economy (see Vis 2007), we observe that – in spite of their diﬀerent levels
of abstraction – they struggle with the same matching problem.
One way of ‘‘solving’’ the problem is to circumvent it by remaining at a high
abstract theoretical level. This implies that theory and hypotheses are not matched at
all because no (clear) empirical test strategy is oﬀered. Torﬁng (2001), for instance,
takes up the diﬃculty of institutional analysis referred to above, namely how to deal
with institutional and policy change. He posits that in four important areas change
has occurred in the welfare state: 1) demand-side macro-economic policy has been
replaced by a supply-side orientation; 2) there has been a shift from welfare to
workfare; 3) the scale and level of social policy making has shifted because authority
has been displaced away from the national level; and 4) decentralized governance
networks have taken over hierarchical state intervention. His proposal is to
recognize that change is evolutionary and the result of the interplay between path
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shaping and path dependency. He oﬀers a well informed and reﬁned comparison
between various institutional approaches and discusses how to analyze institutional
change. To this end, Torﬁng proposes new theoretical concepts such as dislocation
and path shaping, embedded in a more general neo-Gramscian framework that
stresses institution-building as hegemonic projects. He then speculates how path
shaping and path dependency interact to produce change.
His theoretical position is formulated at a very high level of abstraction:
The political answer of the social and political forces to the obstructing eﬀect of
the institutional context on both policy output and policy outcome is the
development of self-reﬂexive strategies. These aim to reduce or eliminate the
eﬀect of path dependency by deliberately restructuring the institutional
framework for adopting and implementing new policies. Such strategies involve
second-order reﬂections, since the hegemonic forces are not concerned with the
form and content of the new policy, but rather with the tactical question of what
they can do in order to remove obstacles to their path-shaping strategy and to
turn new conjunctural opportunities into institutionalized supports of a new
policy path. (Torﬁng 2001: 291)
After a thoughtful discussion of how the various institutionalisms have employed
the concept of path dependency, he restates his position at an ever higher level of
abstraction:
the premise for analyzing path dependency is that a dislocating event disrupts
the structured coherence of a policy path and thereby creates room for an
eﬀective agency engaged in processes of disarticulation and rearticulation which
are not determined by any structural necessity. The dislocation of the old policy
path creates a space for inchoate decisions about how to shape future policy
regulations. These decisions are taken against a background of institutional
ﬂuidity. Whereas a relative institutional unﬁxity is the condition of possibility
for path-shaping strategies, a relative institutional ﬁxity is the condition of
possibility of path-dependent policy reform. (ibid.: 298–299)
The empirical part consists of an illustration of the theoretical account via a
description of failed and successful attempts to reform the Danish welfare state.
Torﬁng (2001: 306) concludes that the new institutionalisms and his own theoretical
contribution ‘‘help us to explicate the mechanisms of path dependency’’. However,
he does not oﬀer an empirical operationalization of the theoretical notions nor does
he specify any hypotheses. He gives no conditions of refutation nor does he reﬂect
upon the research design, the case selection, the data, the sources, and so on. As a
result, he circumvents the problem of matching his highly abstract notions with
hypotheses. He seems quite aware of this feature of his work, but discards it as
unproblematic when he concludes that the ‘‘arguments about path dependency
prove their value even in a brief and sweeping analysis of social policy reform
carried out at a high level of abstraction’’ (ibid.: 306). Our point is that no matter
how valuable his theoretical reﬂections are, by entirely circumventing the matching
problem Torﬁng oﬀers us one narrative about welfare state reform among the many
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that are possible and cannot convince that his theoretical notions are of empirical
relevance.
At the other extreme, we ﬁnd another strategy of evading the matching problem,
that is narrowly focusing on what King et al. (1994) have called the observable
consequences of various theories. This strategy is most often applied in quantitative
comparative studies. It boils down to bringing together various hypotheses present in
the literature, and translating these into a single regression model in order to test
these hypotheses competitively. The matching problem arises here, because no
attempt is made to connect the theories to the hypotheses derived from them, even
though one would need such information in the ﬁrst place for specifying the
hypotheses clearly and correctly. As a result, it is impossible to judge the consistency
of the theories and the model that results from it. It is also impossible to see whether
uncritically adopting variables from very diﬀerent approaches into a single model
actually makes theoretical sense for the problem (for example social policy reform)
at hand. In short, in this approach, which has a long tradition in comparative public
policy studies, especially social policy or welfare state studies (one early example is
Wilensky 1975, a more recent one Castles 2004), researchers usually make quite an
eﬀort to explain empirical operationalizations, hypotheses, the conditions of
refutation, research design, case selection, the quality of the data, sources, and so
on. But their models consist of loosely connected (if at all) hypotheses that have been
isolated from contrasting and even conﬂicting theoretical perspectives.
In this context, for example, Castles and Obinger’s (2007) recent study of social
spending trends sums up the main theoretical approaches to welfare state research in
a single table by simply isolating the main variables, predicted outcomes,
measurement procedures and data sources. They go about as follows. First, they
formulate a baseline model of three variables (level of GDP per capita, average rate
of economic growth, average degree of bourgeois party cabinet incumbency).
Second, they include other variables from various approaches on top of the
incumbency variable already taken from the power resources approach included in
the baseline model. This then becomes a diﬃcult to grasp mixture that has no real
theoretical grounding. It includes the impact on social expenditure of social needs
(taken from functionalist modernization theories), of the timing of welfare state
consolidation (taken from path dependency theories), and of political institutions
(taken from political institutionalism). Finally, they oﬀer a best-ﬁt model by
eliminating the statistically insigniﬁcant variables.
The goal of such designs is usually to debunk widely held but empirically
unsubstantiated beliefs or speculations about the impact of certain developments on
the welfare state, for instance globalization (see especially Castles 2004). To the
extent that the hypotheses tested are accurate matches of the theoretical intentions
and to the extent that they are in fact rejected, debunking is an important result. But
since no attention is paid to how theories and hypotheses are matched, it is diﬃcult
to judge whether the successful debunking eﬀort is the result of a fair test or an
artefact of the design. To give but one illustration, theories of socio-economic
development or modernization are fairly complex and multifaceted accounts –
rooted in the theory of structural-functional diﬀerentiation – of why and how
industrialization and its social and cultural correlates, in interaction with
democratization, lead to higher social spending. It is highly questionable whether
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such a theory can be characterized by simple correlations or causal statements such
as ‘‘economic aﬄuence leads to more expenditure’’ and ‘‘problem pressure leads to
more spending’’ or that it can be operationalized in two key variables; GDP per
capita and a social need index. Such operationalizations do not match the high level
of abstraction at which modernization theory is formulated.
These are extremes of a continuum between which most empirical/analytical
studies of welfare state development and change could be placed. Theoretically
informed thick descriptions, for instance, would be closer to the Torﬁng approach
discussed above. But those studies that provide a combination of variable-oriented
quantitative comparisons and case-oriented qualitative studies (for example Huber
and Stephens 2001, Swank 2002) or approaches that make use of the Qualitative
Comparative method or fuzzy sets (for example Kvist 2007, Vis 2007) would be more
in line with the Castles and Obinger example. Concerning the former group of studies,
the use of method triangulation may serve to alleviate the matching problem, as the
problems linked to very abstract quantitative studies may be addressed in the case
study part. Concerning the latter, the chances of studies using set-theoretic methods
to avoid the matching problem ultimately depend on the carefully and theoretically
motivated choice of how to operationalize set memberships of causal conditions. It is
important to note that all of these studies face the same matching problem, but that
they do make serious eﬀorts, although not always explicitly, to deal with it.
The main advantage of the case-oriented approach over the variable-oriented one
is that the former seems better capable of dealing with the matching problem. This is
because thick descriptions tend to remain much closer to the conceptual framework
than when proper names have been turned into variables (Przeworski and Teune
1970). Let us illustrate the point. A widely accepted insight is that political
institutions of federalism have tended to obstruct the growth of social solidarity.
Federalism is commonly assumed to be an institutional design to make sure that
some level of national unity is preserved by decentralizing power and thus allowing a
larger extent of social, cultural, economic and political diversity between subnational
territorial units than would normally be tolerated in a unitary state. The welfare
state’s function, by contrast, is normally argued to derive from the goal to ensure
equal social rights for all citizens. Federalism and the welfare state, then, apparently
have conﬂicting goals. The received wisdom is that federalism has considerably held
back the development of social policy. As regards the politics of reform, the
argument is that federalism has an impeding eﬀect too, as the multiple veto points in
federal systems make it extremely hard to overcome resistance against changing the
status quo. Quantitative studies time and again reported this eﬀect (see Obinger et al.
2005). But it seems questionable that such studies have matched the theory and the
hypotheses adequately, because not only do comparative historical analyses indicate
that under certain conditions federalism also encourages social spending, but also
that the causal link between federalism and the welfare state runs both ways. In other
words, the causal theory on the relationship between the two concepts becomes
complicated and the demands on matching accordingly rise. The message here is that
we need to become more conscious of how such problems of endogeneity, an all too
common phenomenon in social science (see King et al. 1994), inﬂuence the problem
of matching. Even in the light of lacking deﬁnite solutions, at least paying attention
to such issues would be an improvement.
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The best way to develop the feedback link between federalism and the welfare
state is in careful studies of single country experiences. For instance, Keith Banting
(2005) argues that the development of the welfare state has had a decisive eﬀect on
the centralization of the Canadian federation. Moreover, social programmes played
a key role in establishing the constituent political communities of the federal state
and their political identities. ‘‘Political identities are highly contested in Canada’’,
writes Banting (2005: 90), ‘‘and social programmes have emerged as instruments of
nation-building. For the central government, social policy has been seen as an
instrument of territorial integration, part of the glue holding together a vast country
subject to powerful centrifugal tendencies’’. But also the subnational units, most
obviously Que´bec, used social policy to reinforce their own distinctive regional
community and identity, based on culture and language. For both the federation and
the regions, ‘‘social policy has been an instrument not only of social justice but also
of statecraft’’ (ibid.). The equalization programme of the Canadian ﬁscal system
through which resources are redistributed from the poorer to the wealthier regions
are to enhance national unity. The point of the analysis is that federalism shapes
social policy and social policy shapes federalism and reform of social policy reforms
federalism. Here highly abstract theoretical concepts (such as territorial integration,
political identity and nation-building) and their interconnections play a crucial role
in the description itself. Theory and empirics are closely matched: the concepts have
a descriptive function.
However, at some point researchers who prefer this type of theoretically informed
descriptions of welfare state change will face the problem of generalization. If one
does not try this, or if scope conditions have been formulated that exclude further
generalization, one ends up with only description and little is learned about the
dynamics of welfare state change. Many case studies for this reason refrain from
generalization. However, if one does try to generalize the ﬁndings, then in fact a new
theory is formulated that needs to be tested against new data and this posits the
matching problem all over again. Yet, better to be bold in generalization and create a
new challenge than to refrain from trying to improve the scope of one’s theory.
In order to further substantiate our argument, we ﬁnally present an example taken
from the work of one of the current authors, focusing on ideational leadership as a
cause of welfare state reform. In the welfare state literature that focuses on historical
institutionalism and regime theory, strong institutional and electoral forces prevent
states from conducting far-reaching, that is structural (or institutional) reforms in
social policy. Then, the question arises how such reforms occur at all. The composite
concept of ideational leadership can help to explain why welfare states – despite the
obstacles identiﬁed – do experience at least some far-reaching reforms (Stiller 2004).
The dependent variable is deﬁned as far-reaching or structural reforms (measured by
shifts in the ﬁnancing, beneﬁt, or management structure of a policy area), and the
independent variable is ideational leadership (IL) of key policy makers. IL is
characterized by four aspects: a) rejection of the status quo, b) consistent
legitimization of new policy principles, c) an appeal to reform critics to rethink
their resistance against reform, and d) eﬀorts to build political coalitions for reform
without resorting to tactical ‘‘games’’. The claim is that the combination of these
aspects leads to a substantial reduction in reform resistance, enabling the passing of
structural reforms. According to the resilience literature, such an event presupposes
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the overcoming of institutional and electoral obstacles. The causal mechanisms
linking the separate aspects and structural reform draw on insights from the
literature on ideas in policy making, institutional change and policy change. In
combination, these mechanisms create an ‘‘institutional break-out’’ situation that
reverses lock-in eﬀects and policy stickiness, phenomena implied by path
dependency. Engineering an institutional break-out enables ideational leaders to
adopt structural reforms that transform the policy status quo in any one social policy
area.
The problem of matching occurs in the following way. Cause and eﬀect are
situated on diﬀerent levels of abstraction: on the one hand, IL and its aspects
concern the level of actors, as they relate to the communicative or political behaviour
of individual policy makers. The eﬀects of such behaviour are conceptually situated
at a higher level of abstraction dealing with institutional structures, relating to
institutional lock-in mechanisms surrounding individual policies. Institutional
structures are underlined by the values and interests of those defending policy
arrangements: for instance, political parties and interest groups (and their perception
of switching costs when choosing alternative institutional arrangements). The causal
mechanisms linked to the diﬀerent aspects of IL are: a) policy failure or loss of
eﬀectiveness brings on the search for alternatives; b) creating insights into the logics
of appropriateness and necessity behind the innovation help lowering switching costs
and redeﬁning values underlying old policies; c) reform-critical interest groups are
made to ‘‘face the facts’’ or redeﬁne (the perception) of their interest, lowering
switching costs; and d) forging consensus based more on policy-seeking than power-
seeking motives reduces switching costs.
These mechanisms should ideally bridge the gap between the independent variable,
IL, its operationalization in concrete patterns of argumentation and behaviour of
individual policy makers, and the much more abstract concept of ‘‘institutional
break-out’’ that enables structural reform to materialize. Conceptually, this does not
immediately cause major problems, but empirically it is problematic. The main
question here is twofold: 1) how to operationalize and match causal mechanisms
linking an explanation on the individual actor level with an outcome that is
conditional on the loosening of institutional constraints on the meso level of
structure, and 2) how to ﬁnd data to illustrate the working of each of the theorized
causal mechanisms. For instance, which data should one use to show the eﬀect of a
policy maker criticizing the status quo and credibly promoting innovative reform on
the perception and re-deﬁnition of interest by some crucial opposition party or
interest group? If such data are not available, an alternative would be to use data
that indirectly support (or refute) the mechanism in question. For instance, a trade
union changing its preference during the reform process may be assumed to have
undergone a reconsideration of interests. Another alternative could be to illustrate
the eﬀect of IL by ﬁrst demonstrating its existence with the help of several qualitative
indicators, and subsequently show its role in the adoption of reform by excluding
alternative actor-related strategies (that is concession making) of overcoming reform
obstacles. However, it would be preferable to improve the quality of the argument by
illustrating the causal mechanism that links IL to the acceptance of a reform
proposal. The ideal strategy in evaluating the eﬀects of IL would be ﬁrst to look for
indicators of its several aspects in empirical material and establish whether these
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aspects were all present in a speciﬁc case of reform. Second, suitable data could
illustrate the connection between politicians’ actions and the outcome of structural
reform.
Empirical research on Germany has shown that demonstrating the link between
the theorized causal mechanisms and a speciﬁc reform outcome often proves
diﬃcult. For instance, the case of the adoption of the unemployment insurance
reform ‘‘Hartz IV’’ illustrates well the diﬃculties related to the matching problem.
The central question was whether ideational leadership by the Minister of Labour
Aﬀairs contributed to the eventual adoption of this structural reform. When tracing
the causal mechanisms elaborated above, the ﬁrst such mechanism, concerning the
link between policy makers qualifying the status quo as failure, was hard to prove.
Notably, policy failure (of existing unemployment insurance arrangements) had
already been acknowledged by the opposition parties before the government
announced its ‘‘Hartz IV’’ reform plan. Regarding the eﬀect of cognitive and
normative arguments about the policy alternative on the eventual breakthrough (the
second causal mechanism), it could be shown that some sceptics, especially in the
governing coalition parties, had been convinced. However, it could not be directly
shown that the parliamentary opposition gave up its policy position because of the
government’s eﬀorts to argue for its centralistic solution for providing and
administering the new beneﬁt. Third, despite the minister’s appeals to reform
opponents to co-operate constructively and refrain from detrimental blockades
(third causal mechanism), the appeals to give up reform resistance did not change
the opposition’s negative attitude so that a crucial agreement was only achieved in
the parliamentary reconciliation procedure. Fourth, regarding the link between the
minister’s eﬀorts of political consensus-building and the outcome of structural
reform, the picture was diﬀerent: there was abundant evidence of the minister
actively seeking consensus with reform opponents during the agenda-setting and
legislative preparatory phases. Even when, during a mediation procedure in the ﬁnal
negotiation phase, the minister’s consensus-building eﬀorts met institutional
constraints, he remained centred on achieving a ﬁnal compromise in order to avoid
an outright failure of negotiations.
To sum up, the analysis focused on demonstrating the presence of indicators of IL
rather than direct eﬀects of IL on reform adoption. It did establish, by way of
indirect argument, that the fourth aspect of IL contributed to the breakthrough of
reform, while the eﬀects of the remaining three indicators could not be demonstrated
directly. This nicely illustrates the diﬃculties of ﬁnding appropriate data to
demonstrate causal mechanisms, that is to bridge the gap between levels of analysis
of various variables, related to the matching problem.
Conclusion
In this article, we have presented a brief overview of contemporary issues in
comparative welfare state research and demonstrated that there has been real
progress in our understanding of the multi-dimensionality of the dependent variable,
that is, the conceptualization of welfare state change via various dimensions of
reform. We also found that the debate on welfare state change and reform is not yet
over. Speciﬁcally, we highlighted that the matching problem reinforces still
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unresolved issues with respect to the conceptualization and operationalization of the
dependent variable. Moreover, we found that – in addition to identifying causes and
eﬀects – there are diﬃculties with specifying the causal mechanisms that link causes
and eﬀects. Furthermore, we have tried to demonstrate, by referring to several
examples from the literature using diﬀerent analytical techniques, that matching
theory and hypotheses is a ubiquitous problem in the literature. As a ﬁnal example,
we further elaborated and illustrated the argument with an empirical example from
our research on structural welfare state reform, observing two methodological
problems: 1) the risk of drawing conclusions about one level of analysis using
evidence from another; 2) the problem of translating causal mechanisms formulated
at a high level of abstraction to a lesser level.
We identiﬁed the risk of committing either an ecological or an individualist fallacy
as a result of the matching problem. These fallacies occur when inferences are drawn
about one level of analysis using evidence from another, for example, when on the
basis of an analysis of aggregate-level data inferences are drawn about the behaviour
of individuals (ecological fallacy) or vice versa (individual fallacy) (Landman 2000:
53). In addition, the problem of ‘‘measuring’’ causal mechanisms has to do with
diﬃculties of ‘‘translating’’ them to a lesser level of abstraction which might involve
ﬁnding a whole chain of mechanisms that provide together a plausible link between
the two variables. However, even if such a causal link can be plausibly made
theoretically, data to illustrate its workings may be diﬃcult to obtain or non-existent.
As a ﬁrst step to deal with the matching problem, we propose that researchers pay
more attention to the diﬃculty of bridging the diﬀerence in levels of analysis between
the independent and dependent variables. Furthermore, we need to address the
question of how to use an actor-centred account to explain changes of structure. The
second and related problem concerns the conceptualization and operationalization
of the causal mechanism between these variables. There may be evidence that
ideational leadership is capable of overcoming institutional resistance against
change. But how can we specify precisely how this works?
We believe that questions of this sort are relevant to welfare state scholars and
policy analysts more generally, deserve more attention in the welfare state literature
and certainly merit further discussion. Recognizing such questions and therefore
showing awareness of the matching problem and related methodological diﬃculties
would be a ﬁrst step. We hope our paper will stimulate researchers to think about
potential answers and ways to deal with the matching problem so that we can
improve our theoretical and empirical understanding of mechanisms of welfare state
change.
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